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Introduction
Mozambique is a country located in southern Africa, it borders to 
the north to Tanzania, to the northwest to Malawi, to the west to Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, to the southwest to South Africa and Swaziland, being bathed by 
the Indian Ocean to the east and south. It was colonized by Portugal, whose 
presence began in the 15th century. It was only at the end of the 19th century 
that the effective occupation of the territory occurred. The independence of 
Mozambique happened in 1975, under the leadership of FRELIMO (Lib-
eration Front of Mozambique) and Samora Machel, independent Mozam-
bique's first president. FRELIMO resulted from the union of three nationalist 
movements founded abroad: the National Democratic Union of Mozambique 
(UDENAMO) created in 1960 in Salisbury, Rhodesia; the Union of the Afri-
can Nation of Mozambique (MANU) formed in 1961 by Mozambican workers 
in Tanzania and Kenya, the majority of the Maconde ethnicity; and the National 
African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), created in Malawi 
by Mozambicans exiled there from the province of Tete (Mondlane 1995).
In order to comprehend the international performance of the first 
independent Mozambican Government (1976-1986), the following questions 
were established: (i) what were the guidelines for diplomacy and foreign pol-
icy of Mozambique during the Samora Machel government? (ii) What was 
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the performance of the Samora Machel Government in the face of national 
circumstance, dominated by the RENAMO2 destabilization war, and regional 
circumstance, characterized by aggressions from the Rhodesian regime and 
South Africa's apartheid?
As for the methodological aspects, the qualitative method was used, 
allied with the bibliographic review of works, articles, reports, dissertations 
and theses on the historical and international relations of Mozambique. 
Another technique used was documentary research on the internet on official 
government websites, virtual libraries, public websites and private archives 
and the author's personal collection on the subject. Such collection consists 
of television reports, magazine and newspaper materials, reports from edu-
cational institutions on the subject.
In foreign policy, Figueira (2011) argues that the international struc-
ture determines diplomatic performance and that a country's foreign policy 
would be the result of the interactive dynamics between the domestic and 
international environments. Lopes and Nascimento (2011) argue that the 
factors that condition the formulation of a country's foreign policy can be 
analyzed according to the logic of concentric circles: internal, regional and 
international that mutually interconnect and influence. In the internal circle, 
economic and political stability stand out as factors supporting a vigorous 
and committed foreign policy. At the regional level, relationships distinguish 
themselves within the scope of closer neighbors and a wider neighborhood. 
The international circle includes the dynamics of participation in interna-
tional organizations, of a multilateral nature, as well as relations with other 
countries, namely with international and regional powers (Lopes and Nasci-
mento 2011).
Following the aforementioned theoretical and methodological 
assumptions, the article adopted the perspective of concentric circles, under-
standing that in the diplomacy and foreign policy of the countries, the inter-
nal, regional and international levels are interconnected and mutually depen-
dent. The politics, the domestic economy and the well-being of Mozambicans 
depended on the environment in the region of Southern Africa and on the 
relations with neighboring countries. The relations of Mozambique with its 
neighbors were directly linked to the international arena, to the context of 
2 RENAMO is the acronym for Mozambican National Resistance, a nationalist movement 
founded in Rhodesia in 1976, which developed a war against the Government of Frelimo and 
Mozambique after the independence. The movement said it was fighting communism and 
the lack of freedom in Mozambique.
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the Cold War between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR), 
to the blocs, rivalries and disputes.
The bibliographic review emphasized the interveners of Mozam-
bique's foreign policy such as Mondlane (1995), Mozambican nationalist, 
founder and first president of FRELIMO and, Jardim (1976), Portuguese 
soldier, businessman, diplomat and state advisor who worked in Mozambique 
for twenty-two years, a tenacious defender of Portuguese colonization. Both 
influenced foreign policy in the colonial and post-independence period. On 
the other hand, Christie (1996), a foreign journalist, covered the struggle of 
African nationalist movements, having lived with FRELIMO, in addition to 
becoming the author of the first biography on Samora Machel.
In International Relations, Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994) ana-
lyzed the political transition in Mozambique of 1974 — independence, social-
ist period and civil war — assessing the international and regional context 
of Mozambican strategy and the interaction between internal and external 
factors. The approaches of Zeca (2015), Castellano da Silva (2017) and Mas-
sangaie (2018) were verified.
Zeca (2015) addressed the genesis of Mozambique's foreign policy 
and diplomacy with FRELIMO, whose objectives were to raise support for 
the liberation struggle, the denunciation and isolation of the Portuguese 
colonial regime at the international level in UN forums and in the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU). Mozambique had two opponents: the western 
capitalist system and the region's white minority governments. The regional 
cooperation and the liberation of neighboring states were prerequisites for 
Mozambique's economic and future development (Zeca 2015).
Massangaie (2018) verified the insertion of Mozambique in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the colonial war, 
FRELIMO established relations of friendship with nationalist movements of 
neighboring countries — the movement considered that the Mozambique's 
independence would only be effective when other countries in the region 
were free from colonial domination and racist regimes —, underlining the 
importance of organizations such as the Frontline States (FLS) and SADC.
Mozambique's international insertion was progressive, beginning 
in the 1960s with the efforts of FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mond-
lane. Mozambique's foreign policy had the objective to "create more friends 
and fewer enemies" in the context of Cold War ideological bipolarity. Portu-
gal's refusal to comply with the UN resolution on the self-determination of 
peoples, the support that the Portuguese received from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the ideological conflict of the Cold War 
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influenced the foreign policy decisions made by FRELIMO. On the other 
hand, the threats posed by the South African and Rhodesian regimes and 
the political-economic orientation adopted by FRELIMO after independence, 
also had influences on the foreign policy of the independent Mozambican 
government (Massangaie 2018).
Castellano da Silva (2017) analyzed the state, the elites and the 
regional foreign policy in Mozambique between 1975 and 2015, verifying 
the context, the continuations and changes, as well as the state capacity and 
the relations between the state and society. He distinguishes the elites, their 
role in foreign policy and the government's regional foreign policy. He divides 
the Samora Machel Government into two periods: 1975 to 1983 and 1983 to 
1986. The moment from 1975 to 1988 corresponds to the construction of 
the state and the foreign policy of the Machel Government, in which it was 
necessary a complete reformulation of the state, the economy and relations 
with society, in search of autonomy and development. The adoption of social-
ism and the state structure based on Marxism-Leninism were seen as more 
suitable alternatives by FRELIMO. The construction initiatives in the state 
of Mozambique by FRELIMO since 1975 are evaluated in the ambit of coer-
cion, capital and legitimacy. The Machel Government, composed of the most 
radical wing of FRELIMO, sought to reform the state and strengthen itself 
through revolutionary measures. Mozambique's regional policy was derived 
from the complex state-building process, in which political elites sought to 
concretize their own political projects and respond to domestic and external 
pressures, according to available state capacities (Castellano da Silva 2017).
Colonial war and diplomacy
With the diplomatic channels exhausted, in 1964 FRELIMO resorted 
to armed struggle as a way to liberate the Mozambican territory from Portu-
guese colonization. In the following ten years, the Portuguese regime devel-
oped a colonial war against FRELIMO and the Mozambican people, with the 
logistical and military support of NATO and its natural allies: England, France 
and the US. Portugal also had the support of its African allies: apartheid South 
Africa, Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Kamuzu Banda's Malawi. FRELIMO's 
diplomacy has garnered African support among the already independent 
neighboring nations: Zambia, Tanzania and Algeria. It also obtained support 
from the USSR, East Germany and China.
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In 1973, the crisis of the Portuguese colonial regime worsened as it 
became evident its inability to win wars overseas. On April 25, 1974, the dic-
tatorial government in Portugal was overthrown by the Carnation Revolution. 
There was no alternative to the New Portuguese Government but to negotiate 
the end of the war with FRELIMO. Months after the April 25, the Portuguese 
government sent a diplomatic delegation to Lusaka, capital of Zambia, to meet 
Samora Machel's FRELIMO, proposing a ceasefire, followed by a referendum 
for the people of Mozambique to decide whether they wanted independence 
or the continuation of Portuguese tutelage. Samora vehemently refused the 
proposal, intensifying the war.
With the war's continuation, there were changes in Portuguese diplo-
macy with respect to Africa. The Portuguese Government and FRELIMO 
delegations met again in Zambia and, on September 7, 1974, the Lusaka 
Agreements between Samora Machel and Mário Soares were signed, ending 
the ten-year-old colonial war between Portugal and FRELIMO. The Lusaka 
Agreements established the transfer of powers, a transitional government 
and set the date for Mozambique's independence as June 25, 1975. This was 
the first major victory for FRELIMO's diplomacy and foreign policy, as will 
be seen in the following sections.
The diplomacy of FRELIMO
During the colonial war, the diplomacy of FRELIMO was well articu-
lated. To inform Mozambicans about their work and objectives, as well as the 
situation experienced in the country and its position on the world scenery, 
FRELIMO had the Department of Information, Publicity and Propaganda 
(DIPP) that cooperated with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DRE) — in 
charge of relations with foreign governments and organizations, keeping 
the rest of the world informed about Mozambique and the struggle, orga-
nizing the dislocation of its representatives abroad, as well as participating 
in conferences and visits to other countries explaining what the movement 
was and its problems (Mondlane 1995).
FRELIMO maintained diplomatic relations with African, European 
and Asian countries; with the great polarized world powers, the USA, the 
USSR and China, with capitalist and socialist countries, such as Norway, 
Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Vietnam, North Korea etc. It 
had offices or delegations in the capitals of different countries, the main ones 
being in Cairo, Algiers, Lusaka and Dar-Es-Salaam. Its first militants received 
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political and military training in Algeria, Zambia and Tanzania, as well as in 
China and the USSR, which disputed the hegemony of the socialist world.
It was in Tanzania that FRELIMO established its main base from 
1963, in which its political and military elite was formed and drank from the 
socialist experience from an African perspective. In addition to the military 
base, still in 1963, the Front built its Secondary School in Dar-Es-Salaam, 
the capital of the country, where its cadres were formed. In the province of 
Mtwara, FRELIMO built a hospital as a fundamental support for the armed 
struggle, in which militants wounded and mutilated in the war and other 
victims of Portuguese colonization were treated. In the same location, it was 
created an Educational Center where the children of the combatants stud-
ied. In Dar-Es-Salaam, it was also built the Mozambican Institute, a link of 
friendship with other peoples, receiving foreign delegations and where the 
information and propaganda department operated. The political-military 
formation, the social and economic experience, the African socialism and 
the Ujamaa villages experienced in Tanzania, would serve as inspiration 
years later and would be tested in the areas liberated by FRELIMO and in its 
foreign policy (Wache 2017).
After Algeria's independence in 1962, FRELIMO contacted the lead-
ers of that country, who offered military training to two hundred and fifty 
young Mozambicans. Later, his cadres were formed in the Soviet Union, 
China, East Germany and Cuba. FRELIMO obtained support and solidarity 
from different countries; Zambia and Tanzania were its main military part-
ners during the armed struggle, providing logistical, political-military support, 
hosting bases and welcoming their guerrillas.
In 1970, Marcelino dos Santos traveled to the Vatican with the FRE-
LIMO delegation, where they were received by Pope Paul VI, sympathetic 
to the cause of the independence movements3. However, since 1940, the 
Catholic Church had an agreement with the Portuguese regime and had 
collaborated with it in the colonization of Mozambique. Such a meeting 
revealed FRELIMO's intelligent foreign policy of "making more friends and 
fewer enemies", seeking international support, even among unlikely partners 
and friends of its enemies such as the Vatican and the USA. The visit to the 
Vatican represented a diplomatic victory for FRELIMO and generated dis-
content among the Portuguese government and society, leading to a cooling 
3 The delegation was also composed of Agostinho Neto, representing the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola and, Amílcar Cabral representing the African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde. 
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of traditional relations between the Portuguese Colonial Regime and the 
Catholic Church (Christie 1996).
Despite the socialist inclination, Samora Machel and FRELIMO opted 
for non-alignment in the bipolar conflict, neither with the USA, nor with 
the USSR and China — which disputed hegemony and influences of the 
Socialist Bloc. Even so, it was obtained financial support from the capitalist 
world and training and weapons from the socialist world for its guerrillas. 
FRELIMO obtained economic and financial support from European countries 
such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, which revealed a 
clear anti-colonial position and withdrew their investments in Portuguese 
enterprises in Africa.
The Lusaka Agreement
FRELIMO's diplomacy demonstrated positive results in the nego-
tiations of the Lusaka Agreement with the Portuguese state, which led 
Mozambique to independence. The Agreement was signed in the capital 
of Zambia, on September 7, 1974, mediated by President Kenneth Kaunda. 
In the Agreement, the Portuguese state recognized the right of the people 
of Mozambique to independence, provided a transfer of powers until the 
date of independence, scheduled for June 25, 1975, the anniversary of the 
founding of FRELIMO. The Agreement created a Transitional Government 
and its governance structures — prime minister, ministers, secretaries and 
undersecretaries, police corps — led by FRELIMO (Portugal 1974).
The Transitional Government of Mozambique was led by Joaquim 
Chissano and comprised of Mozambicans and white Portuguese. It was 
marked by the departure of about two hundred thousand Portuguese settlers 
in 1974, following two episodes of violence after the Lusaka Agreements. The 
first, an uprising of Portuguese settlers that occupied some public institu-
tions and the second resulting from clashes between Portuguese commands 
and FRELIMO guerrillas that caused bloody riots in black neighborhoods, 
with the murder of whites and blacks. Even though Samora had ensured 
that FRELIMO never fought against the Portuguese people, the Transitional 
Government did little to stop the Portuguese exodus. On the contrary, it saw 
the presence of a large Portuguese community as a risk to stability and a 
possible threat to FRELIMO's power (Christie 1996).
In FRELIMO's understanding, its struggle was against the colonial 
system of oppression and exploitation of man by man. Those who lived by 
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their honest work would have a positive contribution to make to the recon-
struction of the country, including the white population. Despite the effort 
for the Portuguese community to stay to build an egalitarian and fair coun-
try, the exodus of Portuguese technicians and cadres continued because the 
colonial system had reserved for them the public administration and man-
agement and other services with numerous privileges for them (FRELIMO 
1977; Machel 1979).
The departure of the Portuguese led to the shutdown of factories in 
the textile, metallurgical and chemical industries, and sectors such as edu-
cation, leading to the collapse of important sectors. The Transitional Govern-
ment revealed a lack of skill in conducting domestic diplomacy, using more 
of its police and military forces, hard power, than its power of persuasion, 
soft power4. In the international arena, FRELIMO proved to be competent 
and victorious in its foreign policy.
Independence and the first Government of Mozambique: 
internal challenges
On June 25, 1975, Mozambique's independence was proclaimed by 
Samora Machel and FRELIMO, who were aligned with most of the nationalist 
and socialist movements of Southern Africa. Mozambique changed its name, 
renamed for People's Republic of Mozambique (RPM), having its Constitu-
tion approved five days before Independence, on 20 June. The Constitution 
affirmed the popular character of the country, "a state of popular democracy 
and whose power belonged to workers and peasants", the Republic "being 
guided by the political line defined by Frelimo, the leading force of the State 
and society" (Mozambique 1975, 2nd and 3rd articles). FRELIMO's leaders 
become the leaders of Mozambique, in a single party system, in which the 
state confused itself with the Party.
On June 29, 1975, four days after independence, it was announced 
the first RPM Government, with Samora Machel as President of the Republic 
(PR) and a Council of Ministers constituted of fifteen ministries under the 
direction of the PR. All ministers were senior members of FRELIMO and 
4 In this article, it is understood as hard power the utilization of aggressive force, armed 
forces, military power, intelligence services and even economic sanctions by states to assert 
their interests in foreign policy or in the international arena. Soft power refers to the use 
of convincing power using ideological, social, political, cultural and economic values  and 
issues, as soft forms of power in foreign policy and the international arena.
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simultaneously held portfolios in the Government and the Party, constituted 
of blacks, whites and mestizos.
After the independence, FRELIMO and Mozambique had as main 
challenges: (i) the exodus of Portuguese technicians and the lack of national 
cadres for technical, economic and social areas; (ii) external threats to the 
country's security due to attacks by minority South African and Rhodesian 
apartheid regimes and hostilities of Malawi; (iii) the RENAMO destabilization 
war. On July 24, 1975, Samora Machel nationalized the sectors of education, 
health, land, funeral companies and law services, prohibiting any type of 
private activity in these areas. By nationalizing education and health, Samora 
Machel reached the heart of the Catholic Church by statistizing schools, 
student homes and hospitals created by the Church.
On February 3, 1976, eight months later, the cycle was completed 
with the nationalization of income buildings; private housing leasing was 
prohibited, large companies in the air, land and rail transport sector, bank-
ing and insurance sector, industrial sector and factories were nationalized. 
The nationalization of the last three sectors ended the expectations of small 
and medium-sized Portuguese investors who had left the country, but main-
tained hopes for a possible return as soon as the situation calmed down. 
The nationalizations were a package of nationalization measures towards 
socialist organization and a response to popular concerns, constituting the 
most acclaimed measures in the eyes of the people.
FRELIMO saw in the nationalizations another blow to the structure 
of bourgeois colonial power, affecting the Mozambican petty bourgeoisie that 
owned thousands of small houses in the suburbs of cities (Cardoso 1978). 
During the Portuguese colonial administration, the traditional authorities 
were used as an intermediate administrative structure between the state 
and the native communities. At the internal level, the Party-State tried to 
end certain groups and social practices such as prostitution and idleness, 
considered as behaviors inherent to capitalism and colonialism (Bissio 1978). 
Traditional cultural practices, initiation rituals, traditional ceremonies for 
evoking ancestral spirits, lobolo etc. were forbidden, seen as retrograde and 
contrary to the "construction of the new man", free from traditional prejudices 
and inspired by scientific knowledge, through literacy campaigns and sending 
young people to attend high school and undergraduate education in socialist 
countries (FRELIMO 1977). It acted in the same way against religious groups 
such as Jehovah's Witnesses, traditional authorities, kinglets, sepoys, healers 
and "reactionaries", accusing them of having collaborated with the colonial 
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administration and representing remnants of colonization. These actors were 
sent to "production" and "re-education" camps, spread across the country.
The regional geopolitics
Led by Samora Machel, FRELIMO and Mozambique projected them-
selves into the world because of their internationalism, with a proactive and 
challenging foreign policy in their speeches at the UN, denouncing aggres-
sions of Ian Smith's Rhodesian and South Africa's apartheid regimes against 
their people, affirming its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial self-determina-
tion. Mozambique announced its solidarity with the struggles of the peoples 
of South Africa, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa5, East Timor, the Republic of 
Western Sahara and Palestine.
Mozambique's foreign policy was anti-imperialist and anti-racist. 
With its internationalism, Mozambique granted political asylum to ANC 
(African National Congress) militants, to militants from the Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) and other Timorese citi-
zens, offering scholarships to its students, political-ideological formation to 
its leaders and facilitating the opening of the country's Embassy in Maputo. 
It was one of the first countries to recognize the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO), facilitating the opening of the embassy of the Arab Republic 
of Palestine in Maputo.
In early March 1976, the Government of Samora Machel was the first 
in the world to enforce UN sanctions applied to Rhodesia, closing the border 
with the country, in compliance with UN Resolution No. 216 of 12 November 
1965. With the attitude, Mozambique challenged the regime of Ian Smith and 
at the same time sacrificed millions of dollars a year from trade and transit 
of goods through the port of Beira and railroad towards Rhodesia. Despite 
knowing the negative socio-economic impacts on the population and the 
retaliation of Ian Smith, Samora Machel did not hesitate to close the border 
by imposing such a sacrifice on the Mozambican people. 
The relations with the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia 
were strained because they were racist white minority regimes that defended 
the apartheid, and were opposed to black majority governments in the region. 
Since 1965, the South African regime has opposed FRELIMO's liberation 
struggle against the Portuguese colonization, having collaborated with the 
5 Territory corresponding to the current Republic of Namibia.
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Portuguese regime, including the sending of military troops to act in Mozam-
bican territory against FRELIMO guerrillas (Christie 1996; 1976). 
South Africa waged war against FRELIMO for classic reasons: there 
were political convictions in the context of the Cold War and in its struggle 
against the advance of communism in Southern Africa; in addition, South 
Africa viewed the independence of Mozambique and Angola as a threat to 
their regional hegemony and political, economic and military power. More-
over, the role of South African political-economic elites and of an unbridled 
domestic policy of strengthening security, with the existence of a heavily 
armed and sophisticated army and the development of a military nuclear 
program were condemned by the Mozambican regime (Van Wyk 2014). To 
FRELIMO, the Portuguese, South African apartheid and the Southern Rho-
desia colonial regimes represented the continuation of white colonization 
and oppression to be fought in Southern Africa.
On the other hand, Malawi, a country with which Mozambique shares 
the northwest border, Lake Niassa and the Chire and Zambezi rivers, was 
governed by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who collaborated with the Portuguese 
colonial regime, maintaining close relations with the apartheid and Rhodesia 
regimes. Banda had strained relations with the Mozambican Government, 
particularly in the border region. Malawi does not have direct access to the sea, 
being its only possibility through the Chire and Zambezi rivers, which flow 
into the Indian Ocean, within the Mozambican border6. Malawi depended on 
the Mozambican port of Nacala to supply its territory. The opening to navi-
gation of the rivers Chire and Zambeze in the Mozambican part has always 
been a dream of Banda, which would allow the construction of the port of 
Nsanje, in Malawi. Because of his pro-Western foreign policy, Banda's hos-
tility towards FRELIMO and later towards the Government of Mozambique 
has been public knowledge since colonial times. In the colonial struggle, 
FRELIMO tried to use Malawian territory as a rearguard. However, Banda 
arrested FRELIMO militants and guerrillas who entered its territory and sent 
them to the Portuguese colonial authorities, under the agreement that Banda 
had signed with Portugal, in which he would help maintain the colonial situ-
ation in Mozambique in exchange for territorial annexation — on the Marave 
Map, as long as he did not support FRELIMO nationalists. On the other hand, 
Banda welcomed defectors from FRELIMO and the organizations created by 
6 Former Niassaland, Malawi is a territory in the Southern African hinterland, nestled 
between Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, with rugged terrain and numerous lakes, not 
having access to the Indian Ocean maritime coast. It shares with Mozambique a land border 
and a maritime border with two rivers, Chire and Zambeze and Lake Niassa. The Chire and 
Zambezi rivers flow into the Indian Ocean, in Mozambican territory . 
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them — the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) created in 
1965 and the African National Union of Rombezia (UNAR), created in 1968 
in Malawian territory — which had offices in Malawi and whose actions of 
military provocation caused the closure of FRELIMO's military front in the 
province of Tete (Chambote 2015).
The "Malawian factor" represented, since the beginning of the armed 
struggle, an obstacle to the Mozambican foreign policy and FRELIMO. Several 
times, they tried negotiations with the neighboring country, without success. 
It was the return of one of these negotiations that resulted in the death of 
Samora Machel in 1986. Even so, Malawi's participation in the destabilization 
of Mozambique was smaller, if compared to the actions of South Africa, of 
Rhodesia and of Portuguese colonialism, because it never launched an open 
confrontation against Mozambique.
Flaws in internal diplomacy: the birth of RENAMO
In 1976, armed attacks against populations and socioeconomic infra-
structures, classified by FRELIMO as actions of "armed bandits", began. 
Initiated in the rural areas in the center of the country, the attacks multiplied 
and spread to different regions, as well as the cruelty of their perpetrators, led 
by André Matsangaíssa, a former FRELIMO member. Matsangaíssa joined 
FRELIMO in 1972, being a former member of the Mozambican armed forces 
punished for infractions and sent to a re-education camp in Gorongosa, his 
homeland. Released during an attack by Rhodesian forces, he is taken to 
that country and is later appointed by the Rhodesian forces as leader of the 
Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Only years later MNR will adopt 
the Portuguese language nomenclature of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 
(RENAMO).
The MNR was created in 1975 in Rhodesia, by the Rhodesian army in 
response to the support given by FRELIMO to the Rhodesian nationalists of 
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU), who were fighting for their country's independence 
from the center of Mozambique, region in which they maintained some 
bases and made incursions into Rhodesian territory for the liberation of Ian 
Smith's colonial yoke. In response, the Rhodesian army along with dissi-
dents from FRELIMO and other disgruntled Mozambicans created the MNR, 
which received military training and began conducting guerrilla attacks in 
Mozambique from Rhodesia and under its sponsorship. The initial objective 
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of the Rhodesian forces was to create small groups on the border that would 
impede the actions of Zimbabwean nationalists from Mozambique.
In the beginning, Matsangaíssa specialized in attacking re-education 
camps, freeing the prisoners and recruiting them for his group. Gradually, 
the group of Matsangaíssa executed many riots in rural areas and made itself 
known through its English acronym, MNR. When negotiations began for the 
Lancaster House Agreements that resulted in the Independence of Rhode-
sia, the MNR transferred its base in Phalaborwa in Rhodesia to the forests 
and mountains of the provinces of central Mozambique, establishing it in 
Gorongosa, intensifying the attacks. In 1979, Matsangaíssa died in combat 
during an attack on Frelimo, being succeeded by Afonso Dhlakama.
In 1980, after Rhodesia's independence, commanded by nationalist 
and leader Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-Patriotic Front, the country was 
renamed Zimbabwe, and Mugabe became its first president. Thus Rhodesia's 
support for the MNR ceased, which began to be carried out by the South 
African apartheid regime. With Dhlakama as president and leader of REN-
AMO, such guerrilla gained momentum. Thanks to South African logistical 
support in weapons, fuel, food, uniforms and money, the MNR's guerrilla 
spread throughout Mozambique, increasing its military numbers, which, in 
addition to men, included children and women who were abducted during 
their attacks.
Samora Machel and FRELIMO censored and silenced news of the 
armed attacks, banning any mention of the rebel movement, even arresting 
journalists who reported attacks and news about the MNR. Samora refused 
any contact and negotiations with RENAMO, calling them "armed bandits", 
"matsangaíssas" or "matsangas", expressions with which the RENAMO guer-
rillas were designated during the civil war's period. Only after a decade of 
civil-military warfare, the MNR came to be known as RENAMO.
In the first Government of Mozambique, FRELIMO inherited a failed 
colonial capitalist system, but which, through a combination of populism and 
luck, soon managed to recover. On the other hand, due to FRELIMO's form of 
occupation of the political space, other nationalist projects were excluded and 
forced to make common cause with interests that were opposed to Mozam-
bique's own independence. It was from this explosive mix of marginalized 
opportunism and conservative nationalism that Rhodesia, at first, and South 
Africa, subsequently, created and unleashed RENAMO (Darch 1992).
Samora and FRELIMO failed to recognize the state of war and nego-
tiate with RENAMO, because the latter had its genesis outside the country, 
created by the Rhodesian intelligence services, a strategy formerly used by 
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the British army against the Mau Mau in Kenya to confuse the populations 
and make it difficult to support the liberation movement. In this way, the 
MNR started to carry out destabilization missions in Mozambique, with the 
command and support of Rhodesian intelligence. Later, with its consolida-
tion as an insurgent movement, the MNR, renamed RENAMO, with the 
support of the South African armed forces, gained increasing autonomy. In 
the beginning, it was not foreseeable that RENAMO would carry out a civ-
il-military war as destructive as that which developed in the first half of the 
1980s, which led the Government of Samora to sign the Nkomati Agreement 
(Acordo Incomáti, in potuguese) with South Africa and not with RENAMO. 
The foreign policy
In 1970, FRELIMO supported ZANU guerrillas in their incursions 
into Rhodesia from Mozambican territory, as well as helping their recognition 
in countries like Tanzania and Zambia. At that time, FRELIMO was already 
collaborating with the African National Congress (ANC) with which it shared 
military training in Tanzania. Samora arrives in Tanzania for the first time 
on a flight chartered by the ANC in the company of Joe Slovo, a member of 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) (Christie 1996).
After the independence, in 1976, Mozambique and FRELIMO 
received visits from various representatives of African Portuguese-speaking 
countries, as well as visits by the heads of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (1964-1985) 
and Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991) for the establishment and strength-
ening of friendship, mutual aid and cooperation relations. In February 1977, 
during the III FRELIMO Congress, held in Maputo — in which, for the first 
time, Party members and representatives of society were in liberated territory 
— FRELIMO radicalized, becoming a political party unique in Mozambique, 
with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, proposing to organize a modern state 
and a new society (FRELIMO 1977).
In this event, for the first time the Foreign Policy of Mozambique 
was defined, which denounced the racist imperialism in Southern Africa, the 
policy of Bantustans, the aggressions against the peoples of Western Sahara, 
East Timor, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, with which the FRELIMO sym-
pathized. FRELIMO acknowledged that the independence of Mozambique 
and Angola accentuated the change in the correlation of forces in Southern 
Africa with the end of Portuguese colonization, and, for the first time in the 
region where imperialism and racism dominated in Africa, states emerged 
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that engaged through the socialist revolution way. The Party defines the prin-
ciples and guidelines of the foreign policy of the Republic of Mozambique, 
giving priority to the establishment of diplomatic relations with friendly and 
allied countries, establishing diplomatic relations with the African socialist, 
Asian and European countries that supported them.
In its Foreign Policy, the People's Republic of Mozambique strictly 
applies the principles of Frelimo's political line. In this context, the 
People's Republic of Mozambique gives priority to the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the countries that have always engaged 
by our side. During the Transition, Frelimo agreed to establish diplo-
matic relations since the proclamation of Independence with African, 
socialist, Asian and European countries that have always supported 
us. The People's Republic of Mozambique has established and devel-
ops friendly and cooperative relations in all countries based on the 
principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, 
non-interference in internal affairs and reciprocity of benefits (FRE-
LIMO 1977, 81).
After the Congress, Mozambique's foreign policy started to empha-
size non-alignment, with a clear inclination towards anti-imperialism and the 
need to reduce dependence on South Africa (Zeca 2015). In 1976, Mozam-
bique founded, along with Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, the 
Frontline States (FLS), a regional organization encouraged by the OAU, with 
the objective of supporting African resistances in the face of the continua-
tion of colonization, combating aggression of racist and segregationist white 
minority regimes in the region, politically isolate the South African regime, 
coordinating efforts for the liberation of Rhodesia and Southwest Africa.
Because of the option for one-party socialism and adherence to Marx-
ism-Leninism, Mozambique was the target of an international embargo by 
Western capitalist countries, a reality that affected the country's society, econ-
omy and industries, leading to extreme poverty. On the other hand, the inter-
nal context marked by the exodus of Portuguese technicians, lack of national 
cadres, destabilization of RENAMO, military attacks and bombings by South 
African and Rhodesian forces, forced the Mozambicans to sacrifices.
On March 8, 1977, Samora Machel summoned the young people from 
across the country and made an appeal to them to contribute their knowledge 
and experiences in the reconstruction and development of Mozambique. 
Those who had the 9th, 10th and 11th grades, the last years of high school, 
should sacrifice themselves for the challenges that the country faced, being 
sent to the Training Center 8 of March, to study different areas defined by 
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the Party-State and "formation of the new man", giving up their dreams and 
vocations. From there, nurses, doctors, teachers, soldiers and varied techni-
cians came out. Others went to take courses abroad in socialist countries, 
particularly in the military field to strengthen the country's army and defense. 
These young people became known as the "Generation 8 of March". The 
appeal was effective and demonstrated FRELIMO's ability to mobilize in the 
domestic scenery, amid difficulties and a hostile environment.
With the independence of Rhodesia and its transformation into Zim-
babwe in 1980, renewing the objectives of the FLS and with the economic lib-
eration mission of Southern Africa, in 1980, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe created the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), predecessor of SADC, whose goals were 
the reduction of the economic dependence of the countries in the region in 
relation to South Africa and a bigger cooperation between members for the 
economic balance (Massangaie 2018; Langa and Sacavinda 2019).
Due to the economic crisis in the early 1980s, Mozambique tried to 
join the Council For Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a mutual 
aid organization between socialist countries. However, their adhesion to the 
Bloc was vetoed by the Soviets because of the non-alignment policy practiced 
by Mozambique, preventing the country from accessing the Organization's 
economic loans (Maloa 2016).
Approximation to the capitalist world
With the veto in the COMECON, there was a reorientation of Mozam-
bique's foreign policy, aiming at "making more friends and fewer enemies", 
a principle that has guided FRELIMO since the liberation struggle. Mozam-
bique developed efforts to improve the diplomatic relations with Western 
countries that had economic interests in South Africa. In this context, in 
1983, Samora made an official visit to the most important countries in the 
European Economic Community (EEC), including Portugal.
Two years later, in 1985, Samora visited the Western world and the 
heart of the capitalist world, with two important meetings. On September 
19, he met President Ronald Reagan at the White House in an attempt to 
align Mozambique's economy with the capitalist market. The meeting was 
important, because in the following months the United States reduced its 
support for the South African regime. The meeting between Reagan and 
Machel would have been facilitated by Margareth Thatcher, in return for 
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Samora Machel's mediation in the Lancaster House Agreements that led to 
Zimbabwe's independence.
Days later, on September 27, Samora Machel met with British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in London. Such an unusual encounter between 
a convict communist and a conservative capitalist revealed the existence of 
past contacts. On the other side of Europe, the Soviets became furious with 
Samora Machel's approach to the Western world. Soon after, an "accident" 
occurred in the natural gas extraction mines of Pande, in southern Mozam-
bique, which burned for more than a week, causing incalculable economic 
losses to the country. The exploitation of natural gas in the Pande mines 
was under the responsibility of Soviet engineers and technicians; therefore, 
the Mozambican authorities saw such an "accident" as Moscow's retaliation 
for Samora's visit to the heart of the Western world and its attempt to keep 
Mozambique independent from the Soviets.
Mozambique's economy has never had an abundance of easy resources 
available; its strategic importance for the socialist bloc was smaller, which 
left few alternatives for financial and military support to FRELIMO's action 
to impose itself strategically in the region and in its own territory. The geo-
graphical proximity to South Africa left the country vulnerable to attacks. 
On the other hand, the Party's institutional strength, including the political 
direction, was overshadowed by that of the PR. The formulation of foreign 
policy depended on the elites at the highest levels around the PR. Foreign 
policy in Mozambique was characterized by the reduced quantity of official 
and unofficial inputs, in a context in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
carried out more than formulated policies (Castellano da Silva 2017).
The Nkomati Accord
With a gross domestic product twenty-five times higher than that of 
Mozambique, South Africa was the hegemonic power in southern Africa, in 
addition to being considered an obstacle to political and economic liberation 
in the region. Land attacks and bombings in Mozambique and economic and 
military support to RENAMO destabilized the country, impeding economic 
and agricultural development, in addition to sabotaging the electrical system 
with constant cuts. "Mozambique did not have a modern, well-equipped 
regular army. The guerrilla structure inherited from the days of the war for 
independence appeared to be inadequate in the face of the great infantry and 
artillery and strong air support" (Christie 1996, 157).
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This scenary forced the Samora Machel Government to recognize 
South Africa's economic and military superiority and sign a non-aggression 
agreement with the apartheid regime. In March 1984, Samora Machel and P. 
W. Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, signed in Maputo, on the banks of 
the Nkomati River (Incomáti), the "non-aggression and good neighborhood 
pact" known as the Nkomati Agreement (Acordo Incomáti, in portuguse). In 
the Agreement, Mozambique pledged to deactivate ANC bases and offices 
in its territory and South Africa to end its logistical and military support to 
RENAMO.
The Nkomati Agreement was a humiliation to Samora Machel and 
FRELIMO, being interpreted as a surrender by the nationalist movements 
allied to neighboring countries. In particular, the black South African majority 
was disappointed with Frelimo, feeling betrayed. Julius Nyerere and Kenneth 
Kaunda, heads of state of Tanzania and Zambia respectively, refused to par-
ticipate in the ceremony because they did not agree to such an agreement, 
even though they respected the decision of Samora Machel and FRELIMO.
A few months later, it was realized that South Africa never stopped 
to provide support to RENAMO. Mozambique, in turn, deactivated the ANC 
bases and the logistical support it provided. It was clear that Samora Machel 
was deceived by the apartheid regime in the Nkomati Agreement. On October 
19, 1986, Samora Machel and thirty-three other occupants of his presidential 
flight died in an air crash when their plane crashed in the South African 
town of Mbuzine. The Mozambican delegation was returning from a SADC 
meeting in Zambia, whose agenda was Malawi's strong relations with the 
apartheid regime. Samora and other leaders in the region were trying to 
convince Malawi to abandon such a stance, since it had joined SADC in 
19807. The fall of the presidential plane was considered an attack attributed 
to the apartheid secret services, which would have installed a false Very High 
Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR). Instead of sending signals that 
indicated the Maputo International Airport, it would have induced the pilot 
to the mountains of Mbuzine in South Africa.
7 A month earlier, on September 11, 1986, Samora Machel, Head of State of Mozambique, 
Kenneth Kaunda, Head of State of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe, Head of State of Zimbabwe, 
had traveled to Blantyre, in Malawi, to convince Kamuzu Banda that the interests of the 
Malawian people were no different from other SADC member states, as well as that Malawi's 
irresponsible attitudes could have unpredictable consequences (Chambote 2015).
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Conclusion
In the liberation war, FRELIMO obtained support from different 
capitalist and socialist countries; it opted for a diplomacy whose objective 
was "to make more friends and fewer enemies". After the independence, 
Mozambique took a proactive stance, convincing other countries in the region 
to found two regional organizations: the FLS and the SADCC, in an attempt 
to end colonization and reduce South Africa's economic dependence. Such 
actions demonstrated the capacity for cooperation and regional and interna-
tional convincing, as well as a soft power performance of the foreign policy of 
the first Government of Mozambique. In southern Africa, Mozambique was 
a small power, unable to maintain its own security. Still, it stood out for its 
regional leadership against colonization and apartheid. It tried to influence 
the regional scenery with notorious engagement, supporting the struggles of 
nationalist movements of neighboring countries. In the international arena, 
it opted for non-alignment, standing out for internationalism, activism and 
solidarity.
It had to face alone and simultaneously the RENAMO's destabili-
zation war and the South African, Rhodesian and Malawian aggressions. 
Mozambique found itself weakened, having no technical, human, economic, 
material or military resources to protect its borders and air space, without the 
capacity for hard power, thus adopting a defensive posture. The unsustainable 
situation led Mozambique to recognize the enemy's superiority and sign the 
Nkomati Agreement. The genesis and external support for RENAMO pre-
vented Samora Machel from recognizing the existence of internal support 
for the rebels and their nationalist character, underestimating it and rejecting 
any type of negotiation to end the war. At first, RENAMO was an instrument 
of the Rhodesian regime; in the second, it became part of the South African 
strategy. Any negotiations with RENAMO had to be assured by South Africa.
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ABSTRACT
The article analyzes diplomacy and foreign policy in the first independent Govern-
ment of Mozambique. In the theoretical analysis, the perspective of concentric circles 
moved, seeing the internal, regional and international dimensions as interconnected 
and mutually influenced. As a methodology, bibliographic surveys and documentary 
research were used. Internally, the performance of the Samora Machel Government 
in the construction of the nation-state and responses to domestic conflicts were 
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evaluated. At the regional level, Mozambique's relations with border countries were 
verified. Finally, the state's foreign policy on the continent and its international 
performance were observed. The Samora government adopted a Marxist-Leninist 
nationalist policy defined by the party-state and the country was experiencing armed 
RENAMO attacks that turned into civil-military war. In Southern Africa, Mozambique 
was a Frontline State (FLS) and founder of SADC, showing solidarity with neighbor-
ing peoples, supporting politically and militarily its African nationalist movements 
in the fight against white domination. In the international arena, the state opted 
for non-alignment and developed international activism against colonization and 
apartheid. Mozambican foreign policy and diplomacy have been proactive in the 
region and internationally, managing to move their soft power. However, the Execu-
tive Government faced internal difficulties, with political and economic failures due 
to the systematic destabilization promoted by neighboring South Africa and South 
Rhodesia, as well as refusing to recognize the state of war and to negotiate with 
RENAMO, seen as an extension of the regime's minority interests in the region.
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